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Abstract
The impact of globalization on human quality of life (QOL) is an issue highly debated by 
academics, policy makers, the private sector, social organizations, and even by the general public 
in Asia and elsewhere in the world. There is no doubt that globalization has had a signifi cant im-
pact on the lives of millions of Asian people; however, it is unclear that globalization has reduced 
or increased the gap in human QOL among the rich and poor countries. This paper examines 
whether human QOL in the Asian countries is converging (or diverging), and assesses the impact 
of globalization on QOL trends in the region. Using panel data of selected countries from 1975 
to 2005 over fi ve-year intervals, and applying the dynamic panel data model, the study fi nds that 
human QOL of most countries in the region is moving closer to that of Japan (the benchmark 
country in this study) and that globalization has signifi cant impacts on this convergence. More 
specifi cally, overall indicators of human QOL, measured by the human development index (HDI), 
is converging in Asia and the overall as well as economic, social, and political indicators of glo-
balization are highly signifi cant in the convergence process. Similarly, a disaggregated analysis 
of the sub-constructs of HDI shows that health and education indicators are also converging, 
and globalization indicators have a significant impact on the convergence process. Although 
the income aspect of QOL is found to be diverging sharply, the globalization indicators are not 
signifi cant on the divergence process and the shrinking gap in health and education indicators 
outweigh the income gap, which leads the overall human QOL convergence in the region. To 
complement these fi ndings, the paper calls for a study of some country cases, as well as a study 
of the impact of globalization on human QOL inequality within countries. Such studies, the paper 
concludes, will facilitate the development of specifi c policy recommendations tailored towards 
countries in their cultural context, with a positive (or at least neutral) impact of globalization on 
the reduction of human QOL gaps within them.
1. Introduction
The modern world economy and society are globalizing at a more rapid pace than ever 
before2 and Asia is one of the regions most affected by the current wave of globalization politi-
cally, economically, and socially.3 Consequently, the impacts of globalization and its various di-
mensions have been widely debated and examined by academics, politicians, policymakers, the 
private sector, and even by the general public in Asia. However, there is no consensus regarding 
how the benefi ts of globalization are distributed among Asian countries and their populations. 
Although most of the theoretical and empirical literature on the convergence hypothesis claims 
globalization should help reduce the gap between the rich and poor,4 the convergence effect of 
globalization on the human quality of life (QOL) within Asia is still a matter of debate and is 
rarely explored.
Nonetheless, there are a signifi cant number of studies that assess the impact of globalization 
within Asia. For instance, a comprehensive study by the World Bank confi rmed that the sustained 
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and rapid economic growth in East Asia is more equally distributed than in any other region of 
the world.5 Furthermore, Yusuf claimed that the so-called ?East Asian Miracle? helped global 
income convergence, as a number of economies from the region grew signifi cantly faster than the 
average for the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).6 However, these studies mainly focused on income or materialistic achievements 
following the conventional wisdom of globalization research.7 Of course, income is an important 
part of QOL, but health and education are as well8; hence, these aspects should receive similar re-
search efforts. In this regard, recent works by Kenny assessed empirically the global convergence 
on QOL variables.9 Kenny also evaluated the case of East Asia.10 However, in his analyses, he did 
not introduce any aspect of globalization as an explanatory variable, nor did he assess the over-
all convergence of QOL. Instead, he measured the convergence of different elements separately 
and found that some were converging and some were not. The present study attempts to narrow 
the gap in this area of research by offering an analysis of the current situation of convergence of 
overall human QOL in terms of human development index and its components within the region, 
while undertaking an exploration of the effect of globalization in this convergence (or diver-
gence) process.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the KOF indexes as the working 
defi nition and measurement of globalization, and the human development index as the measure 
of human QOL. The section also highlights the current global as well as Asian trends of these key 
indicators. Section 3 examines the convergence of human development in the region and fi nds 
clear evidence of convergence. It also briefl y discusses the reasons behind this fi nding. Section 4 
empirically tests the impacts of globalization on this convergence process. The section presents 
the methodology and the results simultaneously and shows, as expected, a signifi cant contribu-
tion of globalization to the convergence of human development. Finally, Section 5 offers a brief 
discussion on the fi ndings and suggests further research.
2. Globalization, Human QOL, and Its Trend in Asia 
Since the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of neo-liberal economic policy as the 
dominant approach to economic development and international economic relations, contempo-
rary globalization has not only become a central concern to the donor community and policymak-
ers, but it has also drawn due attention from academics, non-governmental organizations, and 
even from the general public.11 Globalization is one of the most controversial issues whose many 
aspects are questioned and debated, the discussion including the scope, structure, reality, and 
meaning of globalization itself.12 Thus, it is very hard to defi ne globalization in a way that satis-
fi es all stakeholders. This study takes the most comprehensive defi nition and indicator of global-
ization based on academic literature on the impact of globalization. 
Most of the empirical studies in relation to the so-called third wave of globalization13 em-
ploy proxies such as trade, capital fl ows, and openness as measures of globalization, and they use 
cross-section data.14 For example, Heinemann showed that more open countries had lower incre-
ments in government outlays and taxes15 and Vaubel found more open countries having lower 
government consumption.16 Rodrik also used cross-section data and found no effects of capital 
account openness on economic growth.17 Recently, however, some scholars have used panel data 
to fi nd the effects of globalization and have shown positive impacts of openness on growth and 
poverty but revealed mixed impacts on income inequality.18
These detailed studies, however, fail to consider the overall effect of globalization, as they 
focus on individual dimensions of globalization. As all the dimensions of globalization are 
strongly related to each other and are important in explaining the consequence of globalization, 
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omitting such important variables from the regression equation can generate severely biased co-
effi cients.19 In addition, as mentioned earlier, most of these studies, motivated by conventional 
wisdom, focus solely on economic growth, income poverty, and income inequality.
To correct these shortcomings, this study uses the KOF Index of Globalization developed 
by Dreher, which is considered the most comprehensive indicator of globalization available.20 
Although there is another measure of overall globalization developed by A.T. Kearney/Foreign 
Policy Magazine,21 it only ranks the countries in terms of globalization, and the ranking is only 
available for recent years. Thus, the A.T. Kearney Index of Globalization cannot be used for the 
purpose of this study. 
To defi ne globalization by formulating the KOF Index of Globalization, Dreher referred to 
the defi nition given by Keohane and Nye, among others,22 and he summarized the defi nition of glo-
balization in the following three dimensions: 
 economic globalization, characterized as the long-distance fl ow of goods, capital, and ser-• 
vices as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges;
 political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies; and,• 
 social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people.• 23
Dreher then considered all possible elements for each dimension of globalization and de-
veloped the indexes of economic, social, and political globalization by employing appropriate 
weights systematically for each component following the methodology of Gwartney and Law-
son.24 The components of each aspect of globalization were transformed on a zero-to-ten scale 
before the principle components technique was used to construct a weighted summary index 
for individual dimensions of globalization. Then the indexes of economic, social, and political 
globalization were combined into a single index of overall globalization, giving the respective 
weights for each dimension. The single index is named the KOF Index of Globalization, and it is 
the working defi nition and measure of globalization in the present study. Appendix I presents the 
elements considered and weights assigned to calculate the KOF Index of Globalization.
Figure 1, based on the KOF Indexes, presents the trends of the three types of globalization. 
Representing the high turmoil in international security as well as an increasing role of global 
governance, political globalization fluctuates more at higher levels. In comparison, economic 
globalization has a rather steady upward trend. Although social globalization has the lowest in-
dex value, the progress goes along with the pace of other forms of globalization. Overall, global-
ization has moved faster since the beginning of the 1990s, when the fi ve-decade long Cold War 
ended.
The globalization trends in Asia are somehow different from the global trends. As shown in 
Figure 2, Asian globalization is highly driven by economic factors. Political globalization was 
very weak before 1990, but it has gained significant momentum since then. The trend of social 
globalization is much more similar to the trend at the global level.
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Figure 1. Global Trends of Globalization as per KOF Indexes (1970-2006)
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Source:  Author’s calculation using data from Axel Dreher, ?Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evi-
dence from a New Index,? Applied Economics, Vol. 38, No. 10 (2006).
Figure 2. Asian Trends of Globalization as per KOF Indexes (1970-2006)
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Source:  Author’s calculation using data from Axel Dreher, ?Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical 
Evidence from a New Index,? Applied Economics, Vol. 38, No. 10 (2006).
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Figure 3 shows the country-level trends of globalization in Asia. As a huge continent lack-
ing a clear-cut common defi nition, ?Asia? in this study includes both East Asia and the Pacifi c 
and South Asia.25 Thus, it includes some Pacifi c countries but excludes Central Asia and Arab 
regions as these areas are much more integrated with Europe and North Africa than with East and 
South Asia. The study considers all the countries from East Asia and the Pacifi c and South Asia, 
for which all required data are available, but excludes Australia and New Zealand because these 
countries have had nearly the same human development levels as Japan (the benchmark country 
of this study) since 1975 (the base year).26 As can be seen in Figure 3, globalization trends are not 
very different among Asian countries. However, poorer countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh 
appear to be on low levels of globalization. As expected, newly industrialized countries, such as 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have higher levels of globalization. Surpris-
ingly, these countries are marked by even higher levels of globalization than Japan, the second 
largest economy in the world in terms of real GDP value.
Figure 3. Globalization Trends of Selected Asian Countries (1975-2005)
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Source:  Author’s calculation using data from Axel Dreher, ?Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical 
Evidence from a New Index,? Applied Economics, Vol. 38, No. 10 (2006).
The main dependent variable of this study is human QOL. Considering the popularity as 
well as availability of data, the present study uses the Human Development Index (HDI) devel-
oped by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Although HDI does not include 
all the aspects of human QOL, it broadly summarizes the level of human QOL in a single in-
dicator.27 According to the Human Development Report 2007/08, the HDI involves three key 
sub-constructs with corresponding measures: health or longevity (measured by life expectancy 
at birth indicators), knowledge or education (measured by adult literacy rates and combined 
5
enrollment ratios), and an adequate standard of living or income (measured by adjusted per capita 
income in dollar purchase power parity terms).28 (See a detailed explanation of the indexes in 
Appendix II.)
Figure 4. Human Development Trends of World Regions (1975-2005)
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from UNDP, Human Development Reports, various years.
Figure 4 presents the trends of HDI across world regions from 1975 to 2005. The general 
observation is that Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest HDI, followed by South Asia (SAS). This 
fact is consistent with globalization trends. Notably, the East Asia and the Pacifi c (EAP) region 
took a more rapid pace of HDI growth from the beginning of the 1990s and surpassed the global 
average around the beginning of the 21st century. This is because of its high and shared economic 
growth as per the World Bank.29
To give a detailed picture of HDI trends in the Asia-Pacifi c region, the trends for each se-
lected country are drawn in Figure 5. The graph shows that all the countries have an increasing 
trend of human development over time, though a few countries show some fl uctuations and oth-
ers exhibit steady trends. Interestingly, poor countries have a more rapid growth of HDI. This 
fi nding gives a general impression of convergence of human QOL in the region. The next section 
demonstrates the trends of convergence more concretely.
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Figure 5. Human Development Trends of Selected Asian Countries (1975-2005)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Bangladesh/Singapore
Fiji/Vietnam
Japan
Mongolia
Papua NG
Cambodia/Sri Lanka
India
Korea Rep.
Nepal
Philippines
China/Thailand
Indonesia
Malaysia
Pakistan
Samoa
H
um
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ex
?
H
D
I?
6
10
8
2
4
Source:  Author’s calculation using updated data from UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/08.
3. Is Human QOL Converging in Asia?
The mainstream literature on convergence argues that globalization raises the living stan-
dard of all participants in the globalization process. Theoretically, increased international trade 
raises the real incomes of all participating countries. Accessing the superior technology embodied 
in goods or capital, or simply through intellectual exchange, allows greater productivity gains in 
poorer countries. Similarly, international capital fl ows bring new technology and allow countries 
to tap into a larger savings pool, which helps the poor more. Finally, the free fl ow of labor force 
also contributes to convergence, as people from poor countries migrate to richer nations. A num-
ber of empirical papers on convergence support this view. For example, Baumol, and Baumol 
and Wolff tested for the convergence among industrialized countries over the period of a century 
beginning in 1870.30 Other notable papers are on the convergence among OECD countries and 
among individual U.S. states,31 among European Community members,32 among European re-
gions,33 among Spanish provinces,34 and so forth. As economic theory suggests, all these papers 
have shown income convergence. 
However, many other scholars show diverging trends of income and human QOL. For 
example, Maddison and Pritchett demonstrated the historical process of income divergence.35 
However, they did not fully contradict the mainstream belief of a strong causal link between 
globalization and income convergence because a major diversion was created by the discrete 
technological breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution. Also, the income divergence among 
countries over the last 20 years was explained by the fact that globalized countries were attempt-
ing to reach the same industrial standards, and those who did not globalize were left behind.36 
Nevertheless, there are also strong counter-arguments that question the convergence hypothesis 
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as the world is becoming more unequal in terms of per capita income. Indeed, looking back over 
the last 100 years or so, initially poorer countries have tended to experience lower subsequent 
growth rates.37 Poor countries are not catching up with rich ones; rather, it seems the opposite has 
been happening. For example, Ravalian showed that the average income of the richest countries 
in the world was about 10 times that of the poorest around the end of the nineteenth century but 
is closer to 60 times higher today.38 Furthermore, Milanovic argued that inequality between coun-
tries increased sharply since the beginning of the 1980s.39
The convergence literature is not very focused on the Asian region. Instead, the focus is 
generally on groups of countries that have similar characteristics, such as OECD countries, Eu-
ropean countries, or American states. In addition, the convergence literature concentrates heavily 
on the income aspect. Although there are several papers that deal with the convergence of human 
QOL,40 most of them tend to use disaggregated factors of QOL, which cannot give an overall 
picture of human QOL. For instance, Kenney analyzed the convergence of income, health, and 
education separately for the East Asian countries.41 Ram studied the cross-country inequality of 
calorie supply, life expectancy, and adult literacy, and found that the inequality of these indica-
tors across the world was minimal compared to income inequality.42 Ingram found that there was 
strong evidence of convergence in life expectancy, caloric intake, primary enrollment ratios, and 
urbanization—fairly strong evidence of convergence.43 All of the studies, however, fail to con-
sider the overall human QOL as a dependent variable, even though the single index of human 
development has been available since 1990.
Conventional methodology for testing the ?convergence hypothesis? is also critically ques-
tioned. Ravallian pointed out that methodological differences and data type and quality variations 
are the main causes of different findings and arguments on convergence.44 More importantly, 
Quah theoretically rejected using the so-called ?sigma,? coeffi cient of variation and beta conver-
gence.45 Sigma convergence is defi ned as decline over time of the cross-sectional dispersion of a 
variable, which can be measured by looking at the size of standard deviation. For variables that 
trend upward (or downward) across the world over time, it is argued, the coeffi cient of variation 
(standard deviation divided by the mean) might provide a better refl ection of convergence or di-
vergence. A third conventional approach is the beta convergence, which is used frequently in the 
literature on cross-country economic growth. Beta convergence is defi ned if the variable displays 
mean reversion, meaning that the value of a variable at the start is inversely correlated with its 
growth over that period. Quah’s point is valid as he showed how results were misleading because 
of the famous Galton’s fallacy of regression towards the mean.46 Thus, as Quah suggests, this 
study follows an alternative method, which is more transparent about whether convergence oc-
curs or does not occur. However, the study does not take Quah’s model as it is; instead, it follows 
his wisdom.
First, this study directly calculates the human QOL indicator gap between each country and 
the benchmark country over time. As the most developed country in Asia, the study takes Japan 
as the benchmark country to calculate the human QOL gaps, which are also taken as the depen-
dent variables for regression analysis. Symbolically, the human QOL gaps between Japan and 
each country are calculated using simple mathematics as follows:
∆γct = γjt ― γct  ...............................................................................................................  (1)
where, ∆γct is the difference in a particular human QOL indicator between Japan and country c at 
year t; γjt is Japan’s human QOL indicator at year t; and γct is country c’s human QOL indicator at 
time t.
The calculated human QOL indicator gaps between Japan and each country for each fi ve-
year interval are plotted as lines-graphs to observe convergence (or divergence). First, the HDI 
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gaps are calculated as the overall measure of human QOL and then the gaps in individual ele-
ments of HDI are assessed. As can be seen in Figure 6, most of the countries are catching up with 
Japan in terms of human development. The trend line for Japan is constant with 0 value because 
the line represents the difference of HDI value with Japan itself. For almost all other countries, 
trend lines of this HDI gap are sloping downward, meaning that the gap with Japan is closing. 
Clearly, human QOL in Asia is converging.
Figure 6. Trends of HDI-Gaps of Asian Countries with Japan (1975-2005)
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from UNDP, Human Development Reports, various years.
If we see the trends of each individual country, the pace of catching up is rapid for many 
countries. For instance, Singapore and South Korea are catching up quickly and nearly reaching 
the full convergence stage with Japan. This can be explained by their very high level of global-
ization (see Figure 3 for respective globalization trends). Similarly, countries with a higher initial 
gap also tend to have a rapid pace of catching up. Nepal and Bangladesh fall in this category. 
However, in spite of having a higher initial HDI gap, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea are slow 
to catch up. On the other hand, the Philippines and Samoa also have very slow trends, despite 
having relatively low initial HDI gaps with Japan. Thus, based on this analysis, we can conclude 
that the Asian-Pacifi c countries are converging in terms of HDI. 
The remaining part of this section presents the convergence (or divergence) of individual 
components of HDI. Although there is a clear convergence of HDI, some of the individual 
variables are converging and some are not. For example, the health indicator, measured by life 
expectancy at birth, is converging as shown in Figure 7. Similarly, one of the major education in-
dicators used to construct HDI, adult literacy, is also found converging (Figure 8). As in the case 
of HDI, the speed of convergence is higher for some countries, such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and 
Vietnam. On the contrary, another indicator of education, gross school enrollment from primary 
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to tertiary level, is neither converging nor diverging (Figure 9). Some countries, such as Singa-
pore, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Nepal, were able to narrow their gaps with Japan, whereas 
gaps grew for Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, and Mongolia, among others. Interestingly, South 
Korea fully converged with Japan around 1992 and crossed over the benchmark in terms of gross 
school enrollments.
Figure 7. Trends of the “Life Expectancy at Birth”-Gaps with Japan (1975-2005)
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from UNDP, Human Development Reports, various years.
Supporting the existing literature, Figure 10 shows that the income aspect of human QOL 
is diverging in Asia. The gap between the benchmark country Japan and the other countries is 
increasing sharply. Exceptionally, Singapore converged with Japan around 1992, and the rapid 
growth continued so that the gap increased sharply, leaving Japan far behind. Overall, the gap 
was raised sharply during the period of 1980-1990. Since then, the gap increased continuously 
for all the countries except South Korea. 
Based on this simple and transparent assessment, the overall measure of human QOL in terms 
of HDI in Asia was found to be converging. The health aspect of QOL was also converging, but the 
education aspects of QOL showed mixed results, with adult literacy converging and gross school 
enrollment neither converging nor diverging. On the contrary, the income aspect of human QOL 
measured by GDP per capita was sharply diverging.
The following section assesses the impact of globalization on these convergence and divergence 
trends, which is the main question of interest in the present study. 
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Figure 8. Trends of the “Adult Literacy”-Gaps with Japan (1975-2005)
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from various Human Development Reports by UNDP
Figure 9. Trends of the “Gross School Enrollment”-Gaps with Japan (1975-2005)
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from UNDP, Human Development Reports, various years.
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Figure 10. Trends of the “GDP Per Capita”-Gaps with Japan (1975-2005)
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Source:  Author’s calculation using the World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank (ac-
cessed August 27, 2009)
4. Has Globalization Affected Human QOL Convergence?
This section addresses the main question of this study. It estimates combined cross-section 
time-series regressions using the human QOL-gaps of each country with Japan for each period 
(as reported in the previous section) as the dependent variables. These variables are calculated 
using the HDI values and the individual components of HDI as reported in the UNDP’s Human 
Development Reports, which are publicly available on the UNDP home page. HDI is based on 
the achievement of three basic aspects of human QOL: health, education and income. A detailed 
explanation of HDI and its components is presented in Appendix II. All data are taken over fi ve-
year intervals from 1975 to 2005. Similarly, the KOF Index of Globalization is the main explana-
tory variable, which is taken from Dreher, 2006. A detailed explanation of the KOF Index is 
given in Appendix I. 
As some data are not available for all countries in the region, only 19 countries have been 
selected, and the panel is strongly balanced, meaning that most of the data are available for the 
selected countries for all the periods. However, as the value of all dependent variables (human 
QOL-gap) for Japan is 0 over the period, Japan is excluded from the regression analysis. 
The regression estimation model is as follows:
ittiitititit CGyy εηηηγβα +++++++= − ''1  ...............  (2)
where y represents the difference between the human QOL-gaps between Japan and the specifi c 
county (i) in specifi c time (t), yit-1 is the lagged dependent variable, G represents the measures of 
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globalization (negative and positive coeffi cient of G explains the convergence and divergence ef-
fect respectively), C represents the vector of control variables, ηi is the country fi xed effect, ηt is 
the period fi xed effect, and ε is an error term.
The lagged dependent variable is included because HDI-inequality tends to change slowly 
over time. However, it creates several serious methodological problems. Given the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable and fi xed country effects, the OLS estimator is biased and incon-
sistent in short panels.47 To deal with this problem, the analysis uses the system GMM (generalized 
method of moments) estimator, as suggested by Arellano and Bover, and Blundell and Bond.48 
Results are based on the one-step estimator implemented by Roodman, which is explained in de-
tail by Roodman in Stata,49 including Windmeijer’s fi nite sample correction.50
In choosing the set of control variables, the study follows standard practice as much as 
possible. All the control variables and their precise defi nitions and data sources are listed in Ap-
pendix III. First, it includes GDP per capita at the initial point of each 5 year-period to capture 
the effect of the initial level of development on convergence. It also includes the share of the 
under-15 year-olds and the over-64 year-olds relative to the total population (referred to as the 
?age-dependency ratio?). This ratio controls for demographic factors and is expected to vary 
positively with the HDI gap with richer countries. Similarly, overall and urban population growth 
rates are taken as they affect human QOL signifi cantly. It is expected that the overall population 
growth rate correlates positively and urban population growth rates negatively to the QOL-gaps. 
Similarly, irrigated land in percent of total cropland, electricity consumption per capita, and 
annual growth rate of manufacturing sector value added are also included as control variables. 
Irrigated land captures the effect of agricultural infrastructure, which is assumed to be an impor-
tant factor to uplift millions of poor that mostly depend on subsistent agriculture. Electricity con-
sumption per capita is expected to affect human QOL positively as it is one of the key elements 
to make human life easier and more efficient. Manufacturing value added is one of the main 
indicators of industrialization, which is supposed to be crucial in improving people’s lives by cre-
ating employment and producing cheaper goods. The data on these variables are taken from the 
WDI online database of the World Bank.
Finally, democracy indicator is used to gauge the effect of political as well as social liberty 
on human QOL and is expected to have a converging impact on human QOL. Indeed, there is 
a positive relationship between democracy and human QOL.51 The measures of democracy are 
taken from Freedom House and are available for 1972-2008.52 The democracy index consists of 
two key rights. Firstly, the political rights measure is a subjective indicator that annually ranks 
each country on a scale from one (the highest level of political rights) to seven (the lowest level). 
Secondly, the civil liberties measure is used to capture personal rights such as those to free ex-
pression and to organize or demonstrate and is placed on the same scale from one to seven. These 
two Freedom House measures of democracy are averaged and normalized to range from 0 to 100, 
with 100 representing full democracy. 
The time dummies are included in the equation and it is revealed that time and country fi xed 
effects are jointly signifi cant but the results are omitted from the result tables. The variables are 
logged if they have absolute values. The percentage form and index numbers are not logged. The 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix are reported in Appendix IV and Appendix V, re-
spectively.
Tables 1 to 5 report the results, each table for each dependent variable. In Column [1], re-
sults come from regressing all the three indexes of globalization (economic, social, and politi-
cal) including the control and lag dependent variables. In Column [2], a single index of overall 
globalization is regressed instead of three separate indexes. The magnitude and the sign of the 
coeffi cients explain the strength and the direction of the effect of regressors, respectively. Thus, 
the negative sign of a coeffi cient means convergence effect and vice versa. The three, two, and 
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one asterisks (***, **, and *) denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In Table 1, the dependent variable is HDI, which measures the overall ?human QOL.? The 
results show that the HDI gap narrows with globalization, with the coeffi cient being signifi cant 
at 1% level for economic, social as well as overall globalization and just at 10% for political 
globalization. This confi rms that globalization helps to increase the human QOL more in poorer 
countries than in richer ones, resulting in HDI convergence. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical arguments by Sirgy et al. and the empirical fi ndings by Tsai on the positive impacts of 
globalization on human QOL.53
Table 1: Globalization and Human Development Gaps (1975-2005)
Dependent variable: HDI-gap with Japan (∆HDIct﹦HDIjt - HDIct)
[1] [2]
Lagged dependent variable (∆HDIt-1) dropped dropped
Log of GDP per capita 0.2 *** (0.056) 0.278 *** (0.097)
Globalization: Overall globalization index -- -0.031*** (0.009)
Economic globalization index -0.005*** (0.002) --
Social globalization index -0.014*** (0.003) --
Political globalization index -0.002* (0.001) --
Population growth rate 0.119*** (0.049) 0.174** (0.076)
Urban-population growth rate -0.004 (0.009) -0.004 (0.076)
Age dependency ratio -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) -0.002* (0.001) -0.004* (0.002) 
Manufacturing value-added (annual growth rate) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
Log of electricity consumption (kWh per capita) -0.016 (0.02) -0.004 (0.03) 
Democracy index -0.001 (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
Constant dropped dropped
Number of observations 53  53
Notes:  Dynamic panel one step system GMM estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and* denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sources:  Globalization data are taken from Dreher (2006) (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/); GDP per capita 
(current US$), population growth rate, urban-population growth rate, age dependency ratio, irrigated 
land, manufacturing sector value-added, and electricity consumption per capita are taken from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) online database of the World Bank; democracy index is 
calculated from the data of the Freedom House website (http://www.freedomhouse.org/); and human 
development index (HDI) is taken from UNDP, Human Development Report (updated online version 
of HDR 2007/08). The data cover the period from 1975 to 2005 in 5-year intervals.
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The impacts of the control variables are mixed and consistent for both columns. The lag 
dependent variable is dropped due to a high degree of collinearity with the dependent variable. 
Unexpectedly, the HDI gap with Japan rises with higher GDP per capita and the coeffi cient is 
significant at 1%. This correlation might be explained by the increasing income inequality as 
shown in Figure 10. Other results are as expected. Population growth has a diverging effect on 
human QOL with the coeffi cients signifi cant at 1% and 5% level for Column [1] and Column 
[2], respectively. As expected, the population growth and age dependency ratio are found to have 
diverging effects on human QOL. The effects are statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. This as-
sessment shows the importance of controlling the demography of the country to improve human 
QOL. 
On the contrary, although the signifi cance level is weak (at 10%), irrigated land and democ-
racy index have converging effects on QOL. This relationship indicates that the agricultural in-
frastructure is important in reducing the QOL-gap as most of the poorer countries, and their poor 
households, are highly dependent on agriculture. If the governments of poor countries cannot 
provide alternative employment through industrialization, the improvement of the agricultural 
sector is required to uplift the quality of life of their people. Similarly, democracy provides an 
opportunity for people to control their own futures and hopefully improve their quality of life. 
Indeed, no one can make a better decision than the people themselves about their lives. Democ-
racy’s signifi cant impact on the converging process of human QOL further reconfi rms both the 
theories and empirics that suggest democracy as one of the vital factors in improving the life of 
poor people in any country.
Table 2: Globalization and “Life Expectancy at Birth”-Gaps (1975-2005)
Dependent variable: Log of ?life expectancy at birth?-gap with Japan (∆ lifexpct﹦lifexpjt - lifexpct)
[1] [2]
Lagged dependent variable (∆ lifexpt-1) dropped dropped
Log of GDP per capita 0. 896*** (0.201) 0. 643 *** (0.19)
Globalization: Overall globalization index -- -0.029*** (0.011)
Economic globalization index -0.014** (0.007) --
Social globalization index -0.058*** (0.012) --
Political globalization index -0.005 (0.005) --
Population growth rate 0.209 (0.174) -0.11 (0.157)
Urban-population growth rate 0.019 (0.033) 0.071* (0.04)
Age dependency ratio -0.002 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008) 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) -0.011** (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) 
Manufacturing value-added (annual growth rate) -0.005 (0.006) -0.001 (0.008) 
Log of electricity consumption (kWh per capita) -0.087 (0.072) -0.284*** (0.101) 
Democracy index -0.002 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 
Constant dropped dropped
Number of observations 53 53
Notes:  Dynamic panel one step system GMM estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and* denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sources: See Table 1.
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Disaggregated analyses of the human QOL are presented in Table 2 to Table 5. Each vari-
able?health, education, and income?is a dependent variable in each table. These analyses not 
only testify to the impact of globalization on each aspect of human QOL, but also check the va-
lidity of the methodology that is applied in this study. In Table 2, log of life expectancy at birth 
is taken as a dependent variable. As in Table 1, a lag dependent variable is dropped for both 
columns. The impact of overall and social globalization on the convergence of life expectancy at 
birth has been found to be signifi cant at 1%, whereas economic globalization is signifi cant at 5%. 
Political globalization has no signifi cant effect on the convergence process.
The control variables have mixed impacts. As in Table 1, GDP per capita has a diverging 
effect at 1% level for both columns. Irrigated land has been found to have a signifi cant converging 
effect at 5% in Column [1], and the urban-population growth and electricity consumption are 
also signifi cant in reducing the gap at 10% and 1% in Column [2]. The effects of the remaining 
control variables are not signifi cant. However, the overall results are consistent with the case of 
HDI in Table 1.
Table 3: Globalization and “Adult Literacy”-Gap (1975-2005)
Dependent variable: Log of ?adult literacy?-gap with Japan (∆adultlrct﹦adultlrjt - adultlrct)
[1] [2]
Lagged dependent variable (∆adultlrt-1) dropped dropped
Log of GDP per capita 0. 916*** (0.381) 1. 488** (0.644)
Globalization: Overall globalization index -- -0.113** (0.05)
Economic globalization index -0.04*** (0.015) --
Social globalization index -0.035 (0.023) --
Political globalization index -0.023*** (0.008) --
Population growth rate 0.977*** (0.349) 1.93*** (0.667)
Urban-population growth rate -0.018 (0.089) -0.017 (0.129)
Age dependency ratio -0.011 (0.02) -0.011 (0.029) 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) -0.008 (0.009) 0.013 (0.014) 
Manufacturing value-added (annual growth rate) 0.014 (0.017) 0.022 (0.023) 
Log of electricity consumption (kWh per capita) -0.436** (0.209) -0.547** (0.283) 
Democracy index -0.019*** (0.007) -0.018** (0.01) 
Constant dropped dropped
Number of observations 53 53
Notes:  Dynamic panel one step system GMM estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and* denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sources: See Table 1.
16
Table 3 reports the impact of globalization on adult literacy gaps. The main results are con-
sistent with the previous two tables. Globalization has a converging effect with high degree of 
signifi cance. The main difference is that political globalization is signifi cant to reduce the literacy 
gap at 1%, and social globalization is not signifi cant. This can be attributed to the fact that the el-
ements of political globalization, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), 
multilateral organizations as well as bilateral donor agencies, are playing signifi cant roles in edu-
cation, particularly with respect to informal education compared to the role of national govern-
ments. 
As for the control variables, GDP per capita and population growth have highly signifi cant 
diverging effects, as expected. Electricity consumption is found to be signifi cant in reducing the 
literacy gaps at 5% for both columns. In fact, access to electricity, particularly in rural areas, 
greatly improves the study environment for students. 
In the case of democracy, the result reconfi rms the fi ndings of Frey and Al-Roumias; de-
mocracy index is signifi cant in reducing the adult literacy gap at 1% in Column [1] and 5% in 
Column [2]. The effects of the remaining control variables are not signifi cant. These results are 
also highly consistent with the case of HDI in Table 1.
Table 4: Globalization and “Gross School Enrollment”-Gaps (1975-2005)
Dependent variable: Log of ?gross school enrollment?-gap with Japan
(∆enrollct﹦enrolljt - genrollct)
[1] [2]
Lagged dependent variable (∆genrollt-1) 01.116*** (0.297) 1.343*** (0.354)
Log of GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Globalization: Overall globalization index -- -0.043 (0.029)
Economic globalization index -0.037* (0.019) --
Social globalization index 0.033 (0.025) --
Political globalization index -0.001 (0.006) --
Population growth rate dropped dropped
Urban-population growth rate -0.055 (0.06) -0.093 (0.074)
Age dependency ratio 0.014 (0.009) 0.01 (0.01) 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) -0.013* (0.007) -0.004 (0.005) 
Manufacturing value-added (annual growth rate) 0.002 (0.009) -0.003 (0.01) 
Log of electricity consumption (kWh per capita) dropped dropped 
Democracy index -0.01 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) 
Constant dropped dropped
Number of observations 49 49
Notes:  Dynamic panel one step system GMM estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and* denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sources: See Table 1.
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The dependent variable for Table 4 is gross school enrollment—another education-related 
indicator—used to construct HDI. Gross school enrollment is the combined enrollment from pri-
mary to tertiary level education. In this case, lag dependent variable is signifi cant in increasing 
the gap at 1% level for both columns. However, GDP per capita is not signifi cant. 
Surprisingly, only economic globalization is found to have a converging effect at 10% level. 
The other kinds of globalization and overall globalization are insignifi cant. Control variables are 
also found not to be signifi cant save for irrigated land, which has a signifi cant converging effect 
at 10% level, but only in Column 1. These results indicate that school enrollment is affected more 
by the domestic policies rather than globalization. Further analysis is essential to explore this 
issue.
The result for this particular dependent variable is different from that of previous dependent 
variables; in fact, gross school enrollment has been found neither converging nor diverging (Figure 
9). 
However, it is interesting to fi nd the signifi cant converging effect of democracy on school 
enrollment. This result is consistent with the findings of Brown, who empirically showed the 
positive impact of democracy on primary school enrollment.54
Table 5: Globalization and “GDP Per Capita”-Gap (1975-2005)
Dependent variable: Log of ?GDP per capita? gap with Japan 
(∆gdppcpct﹦gdppcpjt - gdppcpct)
[1] [2]
Lagged dependent variable (∆gdppcpt-1) 1.022*** (0.009) 1.028*** (0.009)
Globalization: Overall globalization index -- -0.001 (0.001)
Economic globalization index 0.001 (0.001) --
Social globalization index -0.001 (0.001) --
Political globalization index 0.001* (0.001) --
Population growth rate -0.004 (0.019) 0.007 (0.019)
Urban-population growth rate -0.008** (0.004) -0.007** (0.004)
Age dependency ratio 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) -0.001** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.001) 
Manufacturing value-added (annual growth rate) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Log of electricity consumption (kWh per capita) 0.009 (0.008) 0.005 (0.009) 
Democracy index -0.001** (0) -0.001*** (0) 
Constant dropped dropped
Number of observations 53 53
Notes:  Dynamic panel one step system GMM estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and* denote the signifi cance of the coeffi cients at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sources: See Table 1.
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Finally, Table 5 presents the results for GDP per capita, the income measure of human QOL, 
as a dependent variable. As in Table 4, the lag dependent variable is signifi cant at the 1% level 
in increasing the income gap. This means that the initial level of GDP per capita is a very good 
predictor of future income levels. This phenomenon leads to income divergence. In fact, a clear 
divergence is found by this study (see Figure 10 in the previous section). 
However, globalization has no significant impact on the rising income gap in Asia. The 
result shows that only political globalization has a diverging effect at the 10% level. This is 
consistent with many existing studies, which claim that although the world income inequality 
is rising sharply, it is not the effect of globalization that is changing it; instead, it is the lack of 
globalization in poorer countries.55
The impact of control variables, however, is quite interesting. As expected, urban population 
growth has a signifi cant convergence impact on GDP per capita at the 5% level for both columns. 
Indeed, urbanization leads to better living conditions, offering better facilities and opportunities 
compared to rural areas. Irrigated land and manufacturing sector value-added are also highly 
signifi cant in reducing income gaps in both cases. Expanding irrigated land generates higher ag-
ricultural productivity and increasing the share of manufacturing value-added to GDP enhances 
technological advancement, industrial productivity and also generates more employment in poor-
er countries, which ultimately leads to reduced income gaps. Finally, as the existing literature 
suggests,56 democracy is highly signifi cant in reducing income gaps. It is signifi cant at the 5% 
and 1% levels for Column [1] and Column [2], respectively. 
Overall, although the converging effect of globalization is found insignificant for gross 
school enrollment and GDP per capita, the effects are highly signifi cant for the other variables. 
More importantly, the effect is highly significant in reducing the overall human QOL conver-
gence in terms of HDI. Although the income inequality is rising, the growing level of globaliza-
tion helps to reduce the gap in the overall quality of life for the people of Asia.
5. Conclusion
In the context of contradicting arguments on the convergence hypothesis, the results of this 
study reveal that globalization has signifi cantly reduced the gap between the rich country Japan 
and the rest of the selected Asian and some Pacifi c countries in terms of human QOL. The results 
reconfi rm the convergence hypothesis as far as the human development index and the health and 
education indicators are concerned. The results are also supported by Sab and Smith’s fi ndings 
about education and health convergence from 1970 to 1996.57 Even though GDP per capita is 
found diverging, globalization does not have a signifi cant effect on this diverging trend. Instead, 
most of the control variables are found to have converging effects. Thus, what are the factors that 
are playing a vital role in income divergence? Further analysis is needed to explore this issue.
Similarly, in spite of the sharply diverging trend of GDP per capita, there is a visible con-
vergence of HDI. It is more dichotomous when considering the literature on the relationship of 
income with health and education. However, the economic theory of diminishing marginal return 
of the health and education expenditure explains this dichotomy. Furthermore, even if poorer 
countries gain less income than richer ones, they can improve their people’s health and education 
level at a faster pace.
It is more important to fi nd the signifi cant impact, as we did in this study, of globalization 
on this convergence process because many politicians, policymakers, social organizations, ac-
tivists, and some academics criticize globalization for increasing income inequality. Of course, 
income is one of the leading measures of human QOL, but health and education are also equally, 
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and sometimes more, important. Income is just a means of life, but arguably, health and educa-
tion are ends or goals in life. Therefore, it is argued here that convergence in human QOL matters 
more than convergence in income.
Furthermore, in the context of growing discussion as well as initiatives for Asian regional 
integration and debate on regionalism versus globalization, the fi ndings of this study support the 
view that globalization accelerates regional integration by reducing the human QOL gap between 
the rich and poor countries in the region. Intuitively, the high level of developmental gap is one of 
the main obstacles for regional integration in Asia. Thus, anything that is converging has a favor-
able impact on the regional integration process.
What are the policy implications of these findings? Clearly, both rich and poor countries 
should promote globalization. In view of the questions being raised about the effectiveness of 
development aid,58 and the clear fi ndings of the converging effect of globalization, rather than 
providing more aid, richer countries should be more open towards poorer countries, particularly 
the low-income countries. 
This study is not enough to offer specifi c policy recommendations, and to do so the author 
calls for a study of some country cases; more specifi cally, for an assessment of the impact of glo-
balization on human QOL convergence within countries. Such studies will facilitate the develop-
ment of policy recommendations tailored towards countries in their own cultural contexts for the 
purpose of promoting their globalization with a positive (or at least neutral) impact on the reduc-
tion of human QOL gaps within them.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I. Variables and Their Weights of the KOF Index of Globalization
A. Economic Globalization [38%]
i) Actual Flows (50%) 
Trade – (% of GDP) (19%)
Foreign Direct Investment, fl ows – (% of GDP) (20%)
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks – (% of GDP) (23%)
Portfolio Investment – (% of GDP) (17%)
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals – (% of GDP) (21%)
ii) Restrictions (50%)
Hidden Import Barriers – (21%)
Mean Tariff Rate – (29%)
Taxes on Int’l Trade – (% of current revenue) (25%)
Capital Account Restrictions – (25%)
B. Social Globalization [39%]
i) Data on Personal Contact (34%)
Telephone Traffi c – (26%)
Transfers – (% of GDP) ( 3%)
International Tourism – (26%)
Foreign Population – (% of total population) (20%)
International Letters – (per capita) (26%)
ii) Data on Information Flows (34%)
Internet Users – (per 1000 people) (36%)
Television – (per 1000 people) (36%)
Trade in Newspapers – (% of GDP) (28%)
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (32%)
Number of McDonald's Restaurants – (per capita) (37%)
Number of Ikea – (per capita) (39%)
Trade in books – (% of GDP) (24%)
C. Political Globalization [23%]
Embassies in Country – (25%)
Membership in International Organizations – (28%)
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions – (22%)
International Treaties – (25%)
Notes:  The number in parentheses indicates the weight used to derive the indexes.
 Weights may not sum to 100 because of rounding. All indexes range between 0 (not globalized) and 10 
(globalized).
Source:  Axel Dreher, ?Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a New Index,? Applied 
Economics, Vol. 38, No. 10 (2006), updated in Axel Dreher, Neol Gaston, and Pim Martens, Measur-
ing Globalization - Gauging Its Consequence, New York: Springer, 2008. Also available at: http://glo-
balization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/variables_2009.pdf
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Appendix II. List of Dependent Variables and Their Defi nitions
1. Human development index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development. It measures 
the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development:
a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth.• 
knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate • (with two-thirds weight) and the com-
bined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (with one-third weight).
a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity • 
(PPP) terms in US dollars.
 ?Source:  UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/08.
2. Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if pre-
vailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.
 Source:  World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the United Nations 
Population Division's World Population Prospects, national statistical offi ces, household surveys 
conducted by national agencies, and Macro International.
3. Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
 Source:  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics. Note: Break in series between 1997 and 1998 is due to change from International 
Standard Classifi cation of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. Recent data are provisional. 
4. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that offi cially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary edu-
cation provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an 
elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social sci-
ence, art, and music.
 Source:  United Nations Educational, Scientifi c, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statis-
tics.
 Note:  Break in series between 1997 and 1998 is due to change from International Standard Classifi cation 
of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. Recent data are provisional.
5. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in the 
United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current 
international dollars. 
Source for No. 2 - No. 5: World Bank, WDI online database.
Note:  GDP per capita is also used as control variable for the rest of the dependent variables other than GDP per 
capita.
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Appendix III. List of Control Variables and Their Defi nitions
(Note: All the variables, except Democracy Index, are taken from WDI online database of the World Bank, 
hence the defi nitions are sourced from WDI online database)
1. Annual population growth rate (annual %): Population is based on the de facto defi nition 
of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except 
for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered 
part of the population of the country of origin. 
Source:  World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the United Nations 
Population Division's World Population Prospects, national statistical offi ces, household surveys 
conducted by national agencies, and Macro International.
2. Urban population growth (annual %): Urban population is the midyear population of ar-
eas defi ned as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. 
Source:  World Bank staff estimates using United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects.
3. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents—people younger than 15 or older than 
64—to the working-age population—those ages 15-64. For example, 0.7 means there are 7 
dependents for every 10 working-age people. 
Source:  World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the United Nations 
Population Division's World Population Prospects, national statistical offi ces, household surveys 
conducted by national agencies, and Macro International.
4. Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat 
and power plants, not including transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and 
own use by heat and power plants. 
Source:  International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics and Balances of Non-OECD Countries and 
Energy Statistics of OECD Countries.
5. Irrigated land refers to areas purposely provided with water, including land irrigated by 
controlled fl ooding. Cropland refers to arable land and permanent cropland. 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook and data fi les. 
6. Democracy indicator consists of two key rights: political and civil. Political rights measure 
is based on subjective indicators that annually rank each country on a scale from one (highest 
level of political rights) to seven (lowest level of political rights). Similarly, the civil liber-
ties measure is used to capture personal rights such as those to free expression and to or-
ganize or demonstrate, measured on the same scale from one to seven. These two Freedom 
House measures of democracy are averaged and normalized to range from zero to one hun-
dred, with one hundred representing full democracy. The measures of democracy are taken 
from Freedom House (2009) and are available from 1972 to 2008.
Source:  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2009. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm?page=1
Note:  GDP per capita is also used as the control variable for the rest of the dependent variables, not including 
GDP per capita.
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Appendix IV. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HDI gap 126 0.285 0.128067 0.031 0.56
Life exp. gap 126 15.564 6.953864 1.935 36
Adult literacy gap 126 27.466 23.84905 0 81
Gross enrollment gap 122 20.919 14.42645 -10.1 54
GDP per capita gap 126 14801.7 8408 -13023.5 29349.9
Overall globalization index 126 42.467 15.756 14.45 86.36
Economic globalization 119 44.613 20.029 9.84 96.34
Social globalization 126 33.419 20.875 8.05 91.04
Political globalization 126 53.251 19.250 12.07 90.62
Population growth rate 126 1.806 0.814 -0.557 4.178
Urban-population growth rate 126 2.971 4.549 -42.905 11.277
Age dependency ratio 126 69.631 15.094 37.087 96.422
Irrigated land (% of cropland) 78 22.276 16.435 0 85.365
Manufacturing value-added 
(annual growth rate) 107 5.767 8.516 -22.77 30.29
Electricity consumption (kWh 
per capita) 99 992.333 1707.165 6.569 8507.197
Democracy index 126 46.495 27.026 0 91.667
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